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Abstract  
In this paper we propose a new indicator of monthly global real economic activity, named 
world steel production. We use world steel production, OECD industrial production index 
and Kilian’s rea index to forecast world real GDP, and key commodity prices. We find that 
world steel production generates large statistically significant gains in forecasting world real 
GDP and oil prices, relative to an autoregressive benchmark. A forecast combination of the 
three indices produces statistically significant gains in forecasting world real GDP, oil, 
natural gas, gold and fertilizer prices, relative to an autoregressive benchmark.  
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1. Introduction 
In empirical analysis often an indicator of global real economic activity is used to represent 
the world economy. World real GDP, measured at quarterly frequency in United States (US) 
dollars using purchasing power parity, is broadly accepted and frequently used as a measure 
of global real economic activity. However, there is a lack of degrees of freedom associated 
with quarterly data and measures errors associated with the conversion of domestic real GDP 
to the US currency. To address this issue, economic modellers commonly turn to a monthly 
indicator of global real economic activity. Consequently, several monthly indicators have 
been used in the literature to measure real economic activity (at both country and global 
level).
1
  
World real GDP is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2
 Besides 
some measurement problems, this index is heavily used by international organizations such 
as the IMF, World Bank (WB) and Bank for International Settlements. Central banks also 
report this index in statements of monetary policy and it is generally accepted as the main 
measure of global outputs. Consequently, predicting world real GDP with monthly indicators 
is important for country-specific forecasts and policymakers.
3
Similarly, forecasting 
commodity prices help to understand future economic performance, inflation and level of 
production (see for example Groen and Pesentu (2011)).  
The most widely used indicators of monthly real economic activity are: the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) industrial production, 
taken from Main Economic Indicators (MEI), and Kilian’s rea index. For example, among 
                                                          
1
 We concentrate our analysis on observable indicators and do not consider unobservable global factors, such as 
global factors extracted by large datasets. 
2
 The aggregation of many countries’ GDP in a unique index generally presents measurement problems 
associated with the conversion to a unique currency (US dollar) and relays on the collaboration of many 
statistical agencies. See for example Chen and Ravallion (2010). 
3
 The use of world real GDP is not limited to central banks and international banks. It is also the core global 
indicator in many research areas including: income, inequality and poverty studies. See, for example, Chen and 
Ravallion (2010) or Deaton (2005). 
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others, Mullineaux (1980), Grilli and Roubini (1996), Bernanke et al. (1997), Kim (2001), 
and Kim and Roubini (2001) have used industrial production as a proxy for real economic 
activity for large developed economies. Similarly, Mackowiak (2007) measured real 
economic activity at country level for emerging economies using industrial production.
4
 Not 
without controversy, the index of industrial production for aggregated OECD economies has 
been widely used as a proxy for global real economic activity. For example, Gerlach (1988) 
uses both industrial production index for OECD countries and US industrial production as a 
proxy for global real economic activity in the study of world business cycles under different 
exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) use the industrial 
production index for OECD economies in studying global inflation.  
Kilian (2009) developed an index of global real economic activity (rea) using data of 
dry cargo single voyage ocean freight rates. Kilian’s rea index is not a proxy for global Real 
GDP. Since 2009, this indicator has become a popular choice to represent global real 
economic activity, in particular for oil price studies. Among others, Apergis and Miller (2009) 
model the effect of oil shocks on different country stock prices using this index. Basher et al. 
(2011) use this index to study the relationship between oil prices, exchange rates and 
emerging stock markets. Vespignani and Ratti (2013) build a SVAR model to describe the 
influence of global liquidity on oil prices using Kilian’s rea index as a proxy for global real 
economic activity. Baumeister and Kilian (2013) use this index, in conjunction with other 
variables, to forecast real oil prices. 
                                                          
4
 For large developed economies: Mullineaux (1980) in studying the relationship between unemployment, 
output and inflation for the US; Grilli and Roubini (1996) in studying liquidity models for G7 economies; 
Bernanke et al. (1997) in studying the effect of oil price shocks for the U.S economy; Kim (2001) in addressing 
international transmissions of monetary shocks for non-US G6 economies; and Kim and Roubini (2001) in 
developing a model for exchange anomalies for non-US G7 economies. For emerging economies: Mackowiak 
(2007) studies the transmission mechanism of US shocks to emerging economies, including the following 
countries Chile, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
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We extend the indicator set with a proposed new indicator: world steel production. 
Steel is an important input component of global real economic activity. We show strong 
evidence of the predictability power of world steel production in forecasting; world GDP, oil 
and fertilizer prices. In particular, world steel production generates statistically significant 
gains of up to 34%, 6.50% and 8.40% in forecasting world real GDP, oil and fertilizer prices 
(respectively), relative to an autoregressive benchmark. In a forecast combination exercise 
using world steel production, OECD IP and Kilian’s rea index produce statistically 
significant gains of up to 40%, 11.40% and 4.60% in forecasting world real GDP, natural gas 
and fertilizer prices (respectively), relative to an autoregressive benchmark.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of 
current indicators of global real economic activity used in the literature.  Section 3 
characterise   world steel production monthly series. In sections 4 and 5, we forecast world 
real GDP, and individual’s commodity prices (respectively). Section 6 concludes. 
2. Current indicators of global real economic activity 
In this section we describe two popular choices of monthly indicators of global real economic 
activity: OECD industrial production and Kilian’s rea index. OECD industrial production is 
available from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database from January 1975 to 
the present. The popularity of using this index to represent global real economic activity can 
be partially attributed to the fact that prior to 2009 there were few alternative time series of 
reasonable length that were representative of monthly global real economic activity. This 
index is constructed with data from 34 OECD countries.
5
 According to the OECD MEI 
definition: Area totals for industrial production are annually chain-linked Laspeyres indices. 
                                                          
5
 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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The weights for each yearly link are based on the previous year's world real GDP in 
construction adjusted by GDP purchasing power parity.  
The use of this index as a proxy for global real economic activity relies on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the industrial sector is a good representation of the 
full economy. The second assumption is that the OECD economies are representative of the 
world economy. Prior to 1990, both assumptions were reasonable, as manufacturing sectors 
were a large part of most economies and economic growth was concentrated in developed 
economies. However, most recent empirical evidence indicates a diversion between industrial 
production and other measures of economic activity such as real GDP. For example, Steindel 
(2004) argues that the relationship between industrial production and the goods output 
component of real GDP has diverged significantly since the 2001 recession in the US. 
Steindel (2004) attributes this departure to the growth of imports and the increase of services 
inputs of all goods. Similarly, Herrera et al. (2011) attribute the possible divergence of GDP 
and industrial production to two factors. Firstly, real GDP is a measure of the valued added in 
the economy, while industrial production measures gross output; and secondly, industrial 
production excludes services whose contribution to real GDP has increased over time in the 
US. 
In Kilian’s (2009) influential study on oil prices, Kilian disputes the use OECD 
industrial production indicator as a proxy for global real economic activity. Kilian’s main 
critique is that OECD industrial production excludes emerging economies in Asia such as 
China and India, whose demand for industrial raw materials is thought to be fuelling the 
surge in industrial commodity and oil prices since 2002.
6
 Similarly, with reference to global 
output, Engel and Rogers (2006) note that in terms of purchasing power parity, the combined 
                                                          
6
 Support for this view can also be found in Hamilton (2013) and Kilian and Hicks (2013). 
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real GDP of emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Philippines, and Thailand was 2.43 times the real GDP of the US. Crucini et al. (2011) also 
observe that the share of global output of G7 economies has declined in recent decades while 
the share of emerging economies such as China and India has increased. Kose et al. (2012) 
indicate that emerging market economies (specifically China and India) have become major 
contributors to world output over the period 2003-2007. Kilian (2009) also questions the lack 
of clarity in which the weights of the OECD industrial index are defined, given different 
exchange rates across countries.  
Focusing on the study of oil prices, Kilian (2009) proposed a monthly measure of 
global real economic activity by constructing an index using dry cargo single voyage ocean 
freight rates from “Shipping Statistics and Economics”. Kilian constructs this index using 
monthly data published by Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd from the period January 1968 to 
the present based on various bulk dry cargoes prices, including grain, oilseeds, coal, iron ore, 
fertilizer and scrap metal. When modelling international commodity prices or business cycles, 
an important advantage of this series is that it has a long span, being built from 1968 at a 
monthly frequency.  
Klovland (2004) argues that world real economic activity is by far the most important 
influential variable in determining demand for sea transport. Empirically, Klovland (2004) 
demonstrates that from 1850 to the First World War (WWI), cycles in real economic activity 
can explain the short-term behaviour of shipping freight rates.
7
 In line with this view, Kilian 
(2009) argues that this dry cargo single freight rate index is designed to capture changes in 
the demand for industrial commodities in global markets. 
                                                          
7
 For the period preceding WWI, Tinbergen (1959), Isserlis (1938) and Meuldijk (1940) also document the 
positive correlation between freight rates and real economic activity. Stopford (1997) studies this relationship 
from 1872 to 1989, finding similarities in cyclical peaks and troughs between shipment and business cycles.  
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Kilians’s rea index is constructed with quotes for different commodities, routes and 
ship sizes. However, due to limitations in the data, the index uses equal weights for both 
commodities and routes. Equal weighting may be a source of bias across time as both 
individual commodities and routes are expected to significantly fluctuate across time.
8
 The 
shift in global demand for commodities (and potentially the shift in global routes), has been 
documented by several authors: Kilian (2008), Kilian (2009), Kilian and Hicks (2013) and 
Hamilton (2013) attributes the increase in oil prices since 1997 to the unprecedented increase 
in consumption of oil from newly industrialised economies.
9
 Also supporting the shift in 
global demand for commodities, Barsky and Kilian (2004) and Humphreys (2010) observe 
that industrialisation increases demand for metals substantially and that developments in the 
economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) is the main factor behind the boom in metal 
prices from 2003 to 2008. Radetzki (2006) argues that since 2004, the increase in global 
demand for commodities was the highest on record over the preceding 30 years and that this 
was a consequence of increases in demand from developing Asian economies. The 
unprecedented increase in demand from Asian developing economies (particularly China and 
India) observed since 1997 cannot be properly captured when using equal weights, see for 
example Kilian and Hicks (2013) and Aastveit at al. (2014). 
Kilian’s rea index also uses equal weights for different shipping prices, including 
grain, oilseeds, coal, iron ore, fertilizer, and scrap metal. However, the relative consumption 
and prices of these commodities may shift across time. These inter-temporal changes in 
relative consumption of commodities have been well documented by several studies: Stout 
                                                          
8
 Note that the structure of Kilian’s rea index is similar to a factor model. Factor models are also constructed 
from growth rates. It has been shown that in many applications ignoring cointegration in the latter context has 
little effect. 
9
 This contrasts with the period 1973-1996, when the main factor affecting the price of oil was supply shocks 
originating from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) producers according to Hamilton 
(2013). 
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(2012) shows that oil consumption increased more rapidly than coal consumption between 
1970 and 1980 but at a substantially slower rate than between 1980 and 1995.
10
   
3. World steel production: a new indicator of global real economic activity  
Crude steel is a key input for many industries, including but not limited to: construction, 
transport, energy, packaging, home goods and agriculture. Consequently a world measure of 
steel production is expected to track the global real economic activity fairly well.
11
 The 
World Steel Association (WSA) has published monthly figures for world steel production 
since January 1990. The series aggregates the production of crude steel for 65 countries, 
which was estimated to account for 98% of world steel production in 2013.
12
 The unit of 
measurement is thousands of tonnes. The data are collected by the WSA from several sources, 
including WSA member companies, national statistics offices and regional steel industry 
associations. The data is provided by the WSA for the public only in hardcopy, therefore the 
data was entered manually in a spreadsheet by the authors. The weighting problem associated 
with the OECD industrial production index and Kilian’s rea index does not apply to steel 
                                                          
10
This view is also supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (2014), 
which   indicates that world primary energy consumption (oil, coal and gas) has grown much faster than metal 
and food consumption since 2001. 
11
According to the WSA, steel is a major input for the following goods: Construction (low- and high-rise 
buildings, housing, modular buildings, retail, industrial, education and hospital buildings, sports stadia, stations, 
reinforcing bars for concrete, bridge deck plates, piers and suspension cables, harbours, cladding and roofing, 
office, tunnels, security, coastal and flood defences), Transport (car bodies, engine components, wheels, axles, 
trucks, transmissions, trains, rails, ships, anchor chains, aircraft undercarriages, jet engines components), Energy 
(oil and gas wells and platforms, pipelines, electricity power turbine components, electricity pylons, wind 
turbines), packaging ( food and beverage cans, promotional materials, aerosols, paint and chemical containers, 
bottle tops and caps), home goods (domestic appliances such as fridges, washing machines, ovens and 
microwaves, sinks, radiators, cutlery, hi-fi equipment, razors, pins), agriculture (farm vehicles and machinery, 
storage tanks, tools, structures, walkways, protective equipment). 
12
 The countries (by continent) are: European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, other European countries. North America; Canada, 
Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Trinidad Tobago, the United States. South America; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Africa; Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South 
Africa,. Asia; China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates. 
Oceania; Australia and New Zealand. 
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production, as the latest index is aggregated on monthly basis. Another advantage is that the 
series does not require deflating as steel production is a real variable. 
Additionally, different rates of growth among countries do not bias this indicator as 
crude steel production is a relatively homogenous good that is traded freely around the world. 
Changes in productivity across countries are not problematic for this indicator (as may be the 
case for OECD industrial production index), given that production of steel generally moves 
from more expensive to cheaper producers (countries). For example, from 1990 to 2013, 
Chinese steel production grew by a factor of 10.8 while the US steel production remained 
relatively unchanged for the full sample.  
In Figure 1, world steel production and world real GDP is plotted from Q1 1990 to Q3 
2013. 
13
This figure show that from the start of series in 1990-2002, both series track the last 
part of the period so called “the Great Moderation” well (the period where major economic 
variables such as real GDP growth and inflation began to decline in volatility) and the mild 
recession observed in the US in 2001, which negatively impact the global economy.  From 
2002, both series grew rapidly until the GFC, and this period of rapid growth is explained by 
the acceleration of economic growth and increasing demand for commodities from emerging 
economies. This fast growth period is also observed in world real GDP and global 
commodity prices. In 2008, the GFC took place and world steel production decreases rapidly 
in line with the decline observed by commodity prices and world real GDP. After this 
negative shock, world steel production recovers fast in 2009.  Afterwards the slope of world 
steel production is flatter than in the period 2001-2008. This is consistent with the slower 
pace observed in world real GDP.  
                                                          
13
 Data for world real GDP was downloaded from IMF IFS database and the series ends in 2013. 
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In Figure 2; oil, natural gas, gold, and fertilizer prices are plotted. We index to 
normalize the series for comparison purposes where January 1990=100.  Although 
commodity prices are more volatile than world steel production (as note in this figure), 
similar patterns are observed. In particular, in the last part of the great moderation period 
(1990-2001), the slope of most commodity prices is flat. Natural gas seems to be more 
volatile that other commodities, showing picks in 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008. The pick on 
gold prices observed in 2008, respond to the “save heaven” status this commodity has, as 
savings moved from financial instruments to gold during the global financial crisis.  Similarly, 
to world steel production, a upward trend is observed from 2001 to 2008, in line with the 
periods of unprecedented economic growth observed in world economy and driven by 
emerging countries demand (see for example Kilian and hicks (2013)).  
The use of a closely-related commodity like steel production as an indicator of real 
economic activity was first proposed by Macaulay (1938), who creates a series of pig iron 
production in the US. This indicator was used as a measure of real economic activity before 
1936 (when other series were not available) by several authors including Zarnowitz (1987), 
Gorton (1988) and Calomiris and Hubbard (1989). Miron and Romer (1990) argue that the 
main problem with this indicator is that it is based on only one commodity, whereas in most 
settings a more broadly based indicator would be desirable. This disadvantage also applies to 
world steel production. In addition, another drawback of world steel production, when 
compared with Kilian’s rea index and OECD industrial production is that this index series 
starts only in early 1990s. Accordingly, it is unable to explain any phenomena prior to this 
time.
14
 
                                                          
14
 We have also investigated the CPB World Trade Monitor (WTM) data. This index is constructed by the CPB 
(Central Planning Bureau) Netherlands Bureau for Economic and contains monthly seasonally-adjusted world 
trade data for 81 countries worldwide, which by 2010 jointly accounted for 99% of world trade. Similar to world 
steel production, the aggregation weights (value series are simply added in current dollar prices) and the fact 
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4. Forecasting world real GDP 
4.1 Exercise set-up 
In this section we evaluate the out-of-sample predictive power of these indices in forecasting 
world real GDP. Inoue and Kilian (2004) examine the question of in-sample versus out-of-
sample testing of predictability, motivated by the finding that positive in-sample evidence of 
predictability is often not associated with out-of-sample predictability. Ashley, Granger and 
Schmalensee (1980) claim that in-sample inference without out-of-sample verification is 
likely to be spurious, with an out-of-sample approach inherently involving less overfitting. 
Inoue and Kilian (2004) assert that this argument is not compelling since there is ample 
opportunity for the researcher to data mine in a simulated out-of-sample study, and because 
data snooping adjustments can be made to both tests. Moreover, we provide further evidence 
of a growing literature on out-of-sample nowcasting and forecasting of global real GDP: see 
e.g. Ferrara and Marsilli (2014), Golinelli and Parigi (2014) and Rossiter (2010). 
We split the full quarterly sample 1991Q1-2013Q1 into two periods: an initial in-
sample period 1991Q1-1999Q4 and the out-of-sample (OOS) period 2000Q1-2013Q1.
15
 We 
use a recursive window to estimate the models and produce the forecasts over the different 
vintages. For each of the 53 OOS values, we produce from 1- to 8-step ahead forecasts using 
several different models based on the indicators of global real economy. Precisely, we apply 
the following models: 
                                    (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that this data is reported at country, regional and global levels constitute very important features. The main 
drawbacks are that the index starts only in 1990 and it is released with a two month publication lags. Our 
econometric approach and the forecasting exercise in section 4 and 5 indicate that an index based on the world 
steel production provides superior statistics than the index based on world Trade.  
15
 Our sample split allocates a relative long in-sample set of values for the initial vintages in order to mitigate the 
parameter uncertainty. Therefore, our recursive window assumption implies parameter uncertainty vanishes in 
the limit, supporting Diebold-Mariano type comparison as we do. We also investigate longer out-of-sample 
periods by starting the forecasting exercises 1999Q1 and 1998Q1, and results were qualitatively similar. 
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where         is one of the three indicators of global real economy activity, that is Kilian’s rea 
index, OECD industrial production and world steel production; and    is the error term with 
zero mean and    variance. Each model produces an h-step ahead forecast of detrended 
world real GDP,         , our preferred measure of value added GDP, as: 
     ̃                              (2) 
where a, b and c are the OLS estimates of unknown parameters α and β in Equation (1).16 The 
indicators are monthly variables and we convert them to quarterly observation      using the 
most updated available information.
17
 The release date of data varies between series. The 
timeliest indicator is the world steel production that is published with one-month delay. 
OECD industrial production is published with longer delays; and the Kilian’s rea index 
depends on the author publishing the new information. We assume OECD industrial 
production and Kilian’s rea index is available with 3-month delays, even if there is evidence 
of longer publication delay. World real GDP is also published with delay, but the length of 
delay varies. In our exercise, we assume the release to be at the end of month 3 of the quarter 
and world real GDP from the previous quarter is just released. However, world steel 
production in month 2 of the quarter is available; whereas the most up-to-date information of 
the OECD industrial production and the Kilian’s rea index refers to month 3 of the previous 
quarters.
18
 World steel production is never revised; we ignore revisions for the other two 
indices and for world real GDP. Accordingly, our analysis is a (pseudo) real-time forecasting 
exercise where the 1-step ahead forecast corresponds to nowcast.  
                                                          
16
 We fix the autoregressive lag to 1 because this model outperforms models with more lags. Irrespectively, 
results are qualitative similar for models with more autoregressive lags. Moreover, the linear framework in 
Equation (2) ignores that indicators are available at higher frequency than world real GDP. We leave for future 
research to investigate regression methods that allow for estimation with mixed frequency data, such as MIDAS 
models, see e.g. Ferrara and Marsilli (2014). 
17
 Since the four indicators are indices, the last observation should contain all the history information.  
18
 Results are qualitatively similar when indicators are lagged one-month further. 
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We compare the three individual models to the AR(1) benchmark model where γ=0. 
Moreover, to account for the uncertainty with regard to choice of indicators, we apply 
forecast combination (FC) strategies:  
     ̃                     ̃          (3) 
where       ,          are forecast combination weights. We consider two types of 
weights. First, we assume equal weights,            We label it as FC_EW. Second, we 
compute the weights      as the inverse SPE of model i up to time (t-1) for horizon h.
19
 We 
label it as FC_SPE. Timmermann (2006) discusses benefits of the two methods and provides 
several macroeconomic examples where the two methods provide accurate forecasts relative 
to other models.  
Finally, we test for OOS population-level predictability via the Clark and West (2007) 
(CW) test. The test is based on a mean squared prediction error (MSPE) adjustment to 
account for noise induced in the OOS forecasts by way of estimation of parameters with zero 
population means under the null hypothesis that the benchmark model is the true DGP.  
4.2 Forecasting results  
Table 1 reports the OOS forecasting results for the different individual models and the 
forecast combinations. All the three indicators produce lower MSPE at 1-step ahead, in two 
cases they are statistically significant. However, only the Kilian’s rea index and the world 
steel production generate lower MSPEs for most of the horizons and in the case of the world 
steel production these gains are statistically significant relative to the AR benchmark up to 1-
year ahead. Gains are economically significant, ranging from 30% to 40%.  
                                                          
19
 For the initial h period where the realization is not available to compute the square prediction error, we use 
equal weights in the FC_SPE scheme too. 
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The largest forecast improvements are, however, achieved by the forecast 
combination schemes. The reduction in MSPEs is for all the horizons and statistically 
significant up to 6-steps ahead. The gains are very large and for the FC_SPE scheme that on 
average provides the most accurate results over all horizons the reduction in terms of MSPE 
is 40% and more than 10% at the longer horizons.  
4.3 Local performance 
The previous section does not provide evidence on how the OOS predictive content varies 
across the subsamples considered. We apply the Giacomini and Rossi (2010) fluctuation test. 
This test provides a more formal framework for addressing this question; see also Ravazzolo 
and Rothman (2013). The test is motivated by the notion that if the OOS performance of the 
two models is time-varying, averaging this movement over the OOS period will result in a 
loss of information. In Figures 3 and 4, we provide time series plots for the fluctuation test at 
h = 1 and h=8, the two horizons with higher and lower predictability, at the 10% significance 
level using 28 quarters rolling windows of CW test statistics (for testing the benchmark 
model against the alternatives). If the value of the fluctuation test statistic is greater than the 
critical value at observation t, the null hypothesis that the benchmark model is the true model 
for the 7-year window ending at time t is rejected. 
Figure 3 confirms the predictive power of the forecast combinations, which deliver 
statistically superior predictability over the entire sample, and it also shows that the indicators 
reduce the predictability after the US financial crisis, with the exception of the steel 
production index, which delivers lower statistics at beginning of the sample. The 
combinations, in particular FC_SPE, exploit such differences and improve forecast 
performances. However, the predictability reductions of individual indicators for 8-step ahead 
in Figure 4 is substantial and even the combination schemes are not statistically significant 
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anymore, in particular after 2009. OECD IP performs poorly for the entire sample. Bjørnland, 
Ravazzolo and Thorsrud (2016) discuss in a forecasting framework how the US financial 
crisis has been a global event, but the recovery has been different across countries and a 
global economic factor loses predictability from 2010.  
5. Forecasting commodity prices  
 
5.1 Methodologies 
The second exercise focuses on predict commodity indices. In this exercise, four of the most 
traded commodities are forecasted using Kilian’s rea index, OECD IP, and world steel 
production and forecast combinations are used. The commodities are oil prices, natural gas, 
gold, and fertilizer. Oil and natural gas are the two most-traded energy commodities; gold 
represents precious metals; and fertilizer is an agriculture commodity.
20
 The data is from 
World Bank. 
We split the full monthly sample 1992M1-2013M12 into two periods: an initial in-
sample period 1992M1-1999M12 and the out-of-sample (OOS) period 2000M1-2013M12. 
As in the previous exercise, we use a recursive window to estimate the models and produce 
the forecasts over the different vintages. For each of the 168 OOS values, we produce from 1- 
to 12-month ahead forecasts using several different models based on the indicators of global 
real economic activity. Precisely, we apply the following models: 
 log            
 
    log                      (4) 
                                                          
20
 Note the advantage of using fertilizer prices over other agricultural products are that this commodity is 
storable; this is an advantage for forecasting exercises. Price data of perishable agricultural products may be 
subjected to specific product or geographic features that cannot be captured by global activity indices, see for 
example Ravazzolo, Sveen and Zahiri (2016).  
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where  log     is the log return of commodity index           at time t;   is the 
autoregressive lag;        is one of the three indicators of global real economy activity, that is 
Kilian’s rea index, OECD industrial production and world steel production; and    is the error 
term with zero mean and    variance. We choose the lag order   by studying the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and fix  =6 for all 
indices as both criteria indicate that such a number is optimal for three cases. Each model 
produces an h-step ahead forecast of the log return of commodity index     log      as: 
 log ̃           
 
    log                    (5) 
where a,    and c are the OLS estimates of unknown parameters α,      and   in Equation (5). 
The forecasting analysis is done in real time and timing of real activity economic indices 
corresponds to the GDP example.  
We compare the three individual models to the AR( ) benchmark model and the 
forecast combination (FC) strategies, FC_EW and FC_SPE, we applied in the previous 
section. Also, we test for OOS population-level predictability by using the Clark and West 
(2007) (CW) test.  
5.2 Forecasting commodity prices results  
Table 4 presents the OOS forecasting results for the individual indicators of global real 
economic activity models, and forecast combinations for four different commodities for up to 
12-step ahead (or months). The commodities are placed in the following order in Table 2: a) 
oil prices, b) natural gas, c) gold, and d) fertilizer. All the three indicators produce lower 
MSPEs in at least one of the twelve periods ahead reported for all commodities. In general, 
world steel production produces larger gains than OECD IP and Kilian’s rea index relative to 
the AR benchmark for the forecasts of most commodities.  
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 In Table 2a) the largest gains in forecasting oil prices are observed for world steel 
production. In particular, Wold steel production produces gains at one, three and ten steps-
ahead of 1.60%, 4.50% and 6.50%, respectively. The three coefficients are statistically 
significant at 10% level. The Kilian’s rea index produces only gains of 1.20%, ten months 
ahead but the coefficient is not statistically significant. OECD IP produces gains of 5.80% ten 
months ahead and this result is statistically significant at 10% level. The forecast 
combinations FC_EW and FC_SPE both provide MSPE reductions which are statistically 
significant at one period ahead of up to 1.50%. They also provide economic gains at other 
horizons, for example a 4.60% reduction at ten months, but these are not statistically 
significant.  
 In Table 2b) results for the forecast of natural gas are presented. Both OECD IP and 
world steel production generate some forecast gains which are statistically significant, while 
Kilian’s rea index results are all statistically insignificant. OECD IP produces the largest 
gains for all three indicators for the periods ahead: one, two, five and seven, being the relative 
improvements of 4.5%, 7.4%, 6%, respectively over the benchmark AR process.  Both 
FC_EW and FC_SPE, produce MSPE reductions at one, two, three, five, six months ahead. 
The maximum gains are observed at three months ahead and the gains are up to 6.3%. At the 
1 step ahead differences are significant at 5% level.  
 In forecasting gold (Table 2c), the largest gains are observed for Kilian’s rea index in 
the fourth and fifth steps ahead of 2.70% and 3.80% but not statistically significant. OECD IP 
presents statistically significant (at 10% level) gains of up to 2.70% ten months ahead. The 
forecast combinations, FC_EW and FC_SPE produce gains for the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, 
eighth, ninth months ahead. The maximum gain is 3% for the fourth and fifth month ahead 
over the AR benchmark model and they are significant at 5% and 10% respectively. 
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In Table 2d), the forecasting properties of these three indicators are evaluated for 
fertilizer prices. Both OECD IP and world Steel production produce important gains for these 
commodities which are statistically significant. OECD IP produces gains of 6.20%, 4%, 
4.80%, 11.70%, 4.50% and 2.20% at three, four, five, six, nine and ten months ahead which 
are statistically significant at 5% or 10% levels. World steel production produces gains of 
2.20%, 1.90%, 6.80%, 8.40%, 4.90% and 2.60% at three, four, five, six, and twelve months 
ahead. The forecast combinations also generate sizeable gains for two, three, four, five, seven 
and eight months ahead of around 7.40%, 5.10%, 6.10%, 10.4%, 4.80% and 3.10%, 
respectively; at 3-month ahead horizon such reduction is statically significant at 1%.  
   
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose the use of world steel production as a new monthly indicator of 
global real economic activity in applied studies. World steel can successfully be used to 
forecast world real GDP and key commodity prices. Precisely, world steel production 
generates statistically significant gains of up to 34%, 8.40% in forecasting World real GDP 
and oil prices, relative to an autoregressive benchmark.  
We also documented that a combination of the three indices, world steel production, 
OECD IP and Kilian’s rea index, produces gains of up to 40%, 11.40% and 4.60% in 
forecasting world real GDP, natural gas, and fertilizer prices, relative to an autoregressive 
benchmark. Therefore, our results show that the three indices contain different information, 
in particular for commodity prices, and their combination improves forecast accuracy.  
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Tables  
Table 1: Forecasting world detrended real GDP  
  
Hor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
AR 0.017 0.065 0.134 0.211 0.284 0.347 0.402 0.455 
Kilian’s rea 0.695* 0.708 0.693 0.715 0.747 0.763 0.781 0.816* 
OECD IP 0.828 0.922 1.030 1.131 1.218 1.287 1.332 1.355 
Steel Prod. 0.734** 0.732* 0.687* 0.664* 0.710 0.828 0.948 1.014 
FC_EW 0.599*** 0.612*** 0.627** 0.671*** 0.739** 0.811* 0.876 0.920 
FC_SPE 0.596*** 0.609*** 0.605** 0.624*** 0.680** 0.762* 0.837 0.884 
Note: The table reports the Mean Square Prediction Error of the various alternative models to predict World 
detrended GDP over the sample 2000Q1-2013Q1. The column “AR” reports the MSPE value for the AR(1) 
benchmark model; the other columns present the ratio of the alternative model’s MSPE to the benchmark’s 
MSPE. Bold numbers indicate the alternative model provides lower MSPE. The alternative models refer to 
AR(1) model extended with one of the monthly indicators of global real economic activity studied in the paper 
and combinations of them based on equal weights (FC_EW) or inverted square prediction errors (FC_SPE). We 
measure statistical significance relative to the benchmark model using the Clark and West (2006) tests for 
equality of the average loss. One star * indicates significance at 10% level; two stars ** at 5% level; and three 
stars *** at 1% level. 
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Table 2: Forecasting commodity prices: MSPE  
a) Crude oil prices (energy) 
Series/time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AR 67.085 71.245 71.354 71.497 71.206 68.449 69.837 66.571 67.087 71.203 71.271 73.243 
Kilian’s rea  1.035 1.024 1.027 1.035 1.043 1.050 1.057 1.082 1.035 0.988 1.038 1.039 
OECD IP 0.999 0.988 0.997 1.044 1.034 1.040 1.024 1.046 1.018 0.942* 1.003 0.986 
Steel Prod. 0.984* 0.972 0.955* 0.988 1.008 1.023 1.022 1.036 1.018 0.935* 1.008 1.007 
FC_EW 0.985* 0.997 0.987 1.018 1.030 1.034 1.031 1.058 1.020 0.954 1.016 1.007 
FC_SPE 0.985* 0.997 0.988 1.019 1.030 1.034 1.030 1.057 1.020 0.954 1.016 1.007 
b) Natural gas prices (energy) 
Series/time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AR 104.12
1 
109.21
1 
106.68
6 
100.32
6 
99.628 99.672 99.600 97.179 98.914 100.21
7 
94.576 94.003 
Kilian’s rea  0.988 0.980 1.011 1.025 0.990 1.003 1.035 1.059 1.011 1.024 1.025 1.034 
OECD IP 0.955* 0.926 0.976 1.061 0.940 0.963 0.998 1.020 1.010 1.025 1.002 1.004 
Steel Prod. 0.996 0.960 1.001 0.995 0.978 0.980 1.007 1.029 1.006 1.030 1.010 1.002 
FC_EW 0.964*
* 
0.938* 0.989 1.041 0.957 0.971 1.009 1.025 1.005 1.017 1.008 1.007 
FC_SPE 0.964*
* 
0.937* 0.989 1.039 0.956 0.971 1.008 1.025 1.005 1.016 1.007 1.006 
c) Gold (precious metals) 
Series/time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AR 17.497 17.669 17.239 17.099 17.341 16.556 16.679 16.587 16.396 16.237 16.331 17.344 
Kilian’s rea  0.992 0.987 0.986 0.973 0.962 1.027 0.991 0.981 0.973 0.982 0.981 0.987 
OECD IP 1.008 1.021 1.012 0.996 0.987 1.047 0.991 0.994 1.002 0.973* 1.007 0.998 
Steel Prod. 0.998 1.017 1.019 0.995 0.986 1.035 0.999 0.998 0.989 1.010 0.979 1.015 
FC_EW 0.996 0.999 0.996* 0.974** 0.970* 1.034 0.981* 0.984 0.984* 0.971** 0.983 0.987 
FC_SPE 0.996 0.999 0.997* 0.975** 0.970* 1.034 0.981* 0.984 0.984* 0.971** 0.985 0.987 
d) Fertiliser 
Series/time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AR 27.812 37.237 39.996 42.040 43.916 46.175 46.107 43.785 43.554 41.003 41.083 41.086 
Kilian’s rea  0.980 0.976 0.971 0.960 0.949 0.945 0.964 0.988 1.000 1.015 1.000 1.004 
OECD IP 0.994 0.973 0.938* 0.960* 0.952* 0.883* 0.959 0.954 0.955** 0.978* 0.966 0.965 
Steel Prod. 0.992 0.994 0.978* 0.981 0.932* 0.916* 0.960 0.951 1.007 1.014 0.981 0.974 
FC_EW 0.983 0.955* 0.926*** 0.949** 0.939** 0.896 0.952* 0.961* 0.970* 0.989 0.979 0.981 
FC_SPE 0.983 0.955* 0.927*** 0.949** 0.940** 0.897 0.952* 0.961* 0.969* 0.989 0.979 0.980 
Note: The table reports the Mean Square Prediction Error of the various alternative models to predict World 
detrended GDP over the sample 2000Q1-2013Q1. The column “AR” reports the MSPE value for the AR(1) 
benchmark model; the other columns present the ratio of the alternative model’s MSPE to the benchmark’s 
MSPE. Bold numbers indicate the alternative model provides lower MSPE. The alternative models refer to 
AR(1) model extended with one of the monthly indicators of global real economic activity studied in the paper 
and combinations of them based on equal weights (FC_EW) or inverted square prediction errors (FC_SPE). We 
measure statistical significance relative to the benchmark model using the Clark and West (2006) tests for 
equality of the average loss. One star * indicates significance 10% level; two stars ** at 5% level; and three stars 
*** at 1% level. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: World steel production and world real GDP: 1990Q1 to 2013Q3 
 
Note: The wolrd steel production serie has been seasonally adjusted by the authors using census X12 method. 
 
 
Figure 2: Oil, gas, gold and fertilizer price indexes (100=1990), monthly series: 1990M1 to 
2016M12 
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Figure 3: Giacomini and Rossi (2010) fluctuation test for equal out-of-sample predictability 
at h=1 
 
Note: Giacomini and Rossi (2010) Fluctuation test based on sequences of Clark and West (2007) test statistics 
(for testing equality of the average loss of the alternative models and the benchmark model), with µ=0.5 and 
m=P, where m = the size of the rolling window of CW statistics and P = the number of OOS observations, for 
the OOS period 2000Q1-2013Q1, such that the length of each window of CW statistics is 28 quarters, i.e., 7 
years. The x-axis refers to the last value of each sample. Fluctuation test critical value at the 10% significance 
level in dotted lines; if the Fluctuation test statistic exceeds the critical value, the null that the benchmark model 
is the true model is rejected for the particular window. Benchmark model is an AR(1), alternative models in 
legend are defined in Section 6. 
 
Figure 4: Giacomini and Rossi (2010) Fluctuation Test for Equal Out-of-Sample 
Predictability at h=8.  
 
Note: See Figure 2.  
